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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
STATE OF GEORGIA

EQUITRADE INTERNATIONAL, INC.
and JAMES ALAN WEST,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LEE ANNE BUSMAN, individually,
BARTER CONSULT ANTS
INTERNATIONAL, INC. and LEE
ANNE INC.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action File No.
2013CV233445

ORDER

Before this Court are Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Consent Judgment and a Motion for
Emergency Hearing and to Cancel All Levies on Plaintiff and to Set Aside Consent Judgment.
Having considered the briefing, the Court finds as follows:
Equitrade International, Inc. and James Alan West filed these two motions on September
20 and September 22,2016 asking the Court to set aside the entry of a Consent Judgment filed
on March 31, 2016. After entry of the Consent Judgment, a new term of Court began on May 2,
2016, the first Monday of May. See O.C.O.A. § 15-6-3(3).

"[A] judgment not based upon ajury

verdict is considered within the breast of the court during the term of court in which it is entered,
and a court may exercise its discretion for meritorious reasons to set aside a judgment within the
same term of court." Miranda v. Stewart, 312 Ga. App. 290, 291 (2011) (quoting First Baptist
Church, etc. v. King, 208 Ga.App. 250, 251(1) (1993».

"Once that term of court has ended,

however, a judgment may only be set aside under the procedures in O.C.O.A. § 9-11-60(d)." Id.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d) provides "A motion to set aside may be brought to set aside a judgment

based upon: (1) Lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter; (2) Fraud, accident, or
mistake or the acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant; or
(3) A nonamendable defect which appears upon the face of the record or pleadings."

In addition,

"Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and errors therein arising
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on
the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g).
The parties to this action entered into a Settlement Agreement and General Mutual
Release effective July 18, 2014 (the "Settlement Agreement").

Under the Settlement Agreement,

West and Equitrade agreed to pay Lee Anne Hearn, I individually, a total sum of $72,000 with
monthly payments made over 48 consecutive months. If Hearn did not receive a payment, she
was entitled to file a Consent Judgment that was executed by all parties contemporaneously with
the Settlement Agreement.

If all payments were made, Hearn was to mail the Consent Judgment

to West and Equitrade. Hearn has not received a payment on the Settlement Agreement since
Aprilof2015.
The Settlement Agreement also acknowledged that there was an outstanding IRS debt for
Barter Consultants International, Inc. ("Barter"). Hearn was the President of Barter. The
Settlement Agreement stated West and Equitrade would be "responsible for and assume the
entire Trust Fund Debt and the charges directly associated therewith owed to the Internal
Revenue Service on behalf of Lee Anne Busman [Hearn] and Barter Consultants International,
Inc. and shall indemnify and hold harmless Lee Anne Busman [Hearn] and Barter Consultants
I Hearn was formerly Lee Anne Busman, and will be referred to as Hearn throughout this Order,
regardless of the name appearing on the various documents.

2
EquitradeInternational, Inc. and James Allen West v. Busman, et aL.; CAFN 2013CV233445; Order

International, Inc., for said debt so owed to the Internal Revenue Service." In an Affidavit filed
with the Court on April 1, 2016 (a day after the Consent Judgment was entered), West claims
that on May 6, 2015, he received a Notice of Levy from the IRS (a copy of which is not before
the Court). West claims the Notice of Levy directed Equitrade and him, personally, "to remit to
the IRS all payments due to the defendants."

West asserts he has been sending the payments due

to Hearn directly to the IRS in order to comply with this Notice of Levy.
Finally, Paragraph 4 of the Settlement Agreement states: "The Parties shall direct their
respective counsel of record to execute and file the necessary papers with the Clerk of the
Superior Court of Fulton County, State of Georgia, dismissing with Prejudice the Superior Court
Action." The Settlement Agreement does not state when the papers dismissing the action with
prejudice were to be filed.
1. The Mutual Dismissal With Prejudice was properly vacated.

On July 21, 2014, a copy ofthe Consent Judgment and a Mutual Dismissal With
Prejudice were submitted directly to the COU1i and both were inadvertently filed on July 23,
2014. The Court was notified of this error, and based on the terms of the Settlement Agreement
and with the consent of the parties the Court vacated the "Consent Judgment." The Court also
vacated the "Mutual Dismissal With Prejudice" by Order filed July 23,2014 and upon a Motion
by Hearn's Counsel, entered an order directing the Clerk of Court to administratively close the
case until the terms of the Settlement Agreement were met, at which time the Court ordered the
parties to file dismissal of all claims with prejudice. Thus, as stated in the Order, the Court would
retain complete jurisdiction to re-open the action if necessary. West now claims that he would
3
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not have signed the Settlement Agreement if he believed a dismissal with prejudice could be
reversed.

However, he did not make this argument until nearly two years after the Mutual

Dismissal With Prejudice was vacated and he signed the Settlement Agreement which expressly
allows Hearn to file the Consent Judgment in this case should West and Equitrade fail to make
required payments.

A contemporaneous

dismissal of all claims with prejudice would render the

Consent Judgment contemplated in the Settlement Agreement a nullity. The Court would not be
able to enter a Consent Judgment in a case which was dismissed with prejudice as it would not
maintain jurisdiction.

This is an untenable result under the Settlement Agreement since it

explicitly allows Hearn to file the Consent Judgment in this matter if West and Equitrade failed
to make payments.

Thus, the Court had a meritorious reason to vacate the Mutual Dismissal

With Prejudice and did so within the same term of Court.

2. Was Entry of the Consent Judgment Properly Noticed?
On February 25,2016, following the failure of West and Equitrade to make monthly
payments under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Hearn filed a Motion to "Motion to Set
Aside Dismissal With Prejudice/ and Vacate the Administrative Closure and Enter Consent
Judgment." In support of this Motion Kevin Moore, attorney for Hearn, filed an Affidavit of
Non-Payment.' The time for filing a response passed, and the Court entered the Consent
Judgment on March 31,2016.

2

3

On April 1, 2016, Equitrade and West filed an out-of-time

As noted above, the Dismissal With Prejudice had already been vacated months earlier.
All payments due to Hearn were paid through her attorney, Moore.
4
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response," without seeking leave to do so. The COUli did not consider this response as the
Consent Judgment had already been entered, and Equitrade and West did not file a motion to set
aside or vacate the Consent Judgment after these motions were filed.
In their motions, West and Equitrade claim that they did not receive notice of the filing of
the Consent Judgment until they were notified by a third party.?
mandatory electronic

This Court moved to

filing as of October 5, 2015, after this case was administratively

closed.6

Upon reviewing the electronic service record for the Consent Judgment, it is evident that West
and Equitrade's counsel were not served a copy of the Consent Judgment through the electronic
filing software at the time it was filed. Though the E-File Order notified litigants that the COUli
shall issue, file, and serve all orders electronically, in this particular situation, it is not surprising
that Equitrade's counsel would not have registered for e-filing in an administratively closed case
until required to make a filing. In this case, that filing was the April 1 out-of-time response filed
after entry of the Consent Order. Under O.CG.A. § 15-6-21 ( c), the court has an obligation to file
its decision with the Clerk of COUli and to notify the attorney or attorneys of the losing party of
his or her decision. In this case, it appears that West and Equitrade's counsel were not notified.
The out-of-time Response also refers to Exhibits that were neither filed into the docket in the
case nor otherwise submitted to the Court.
5 From the electronic filing system records, it appears that the April 1, 2016 response was the
first document electronically filed by Equitrade' s attorney. On August 19, 2015, Mr. Moore
filed an Affidavit of Non-Payment requesting the Clerk issue a Writ of Fieri Facias. This
Affidavit was not electronically served. The Writ was recorded on August 23. Summons of
Garnishment on a Financial Institute were served on SunTrust Bank on September 20,2016. See
Busman v. West, No. 16GR000497 (Fulton State Court). Plaintiffs ask the COUli to cancel all
levies, but the Court is unaware of any levies, and Plaintiffs have not provided a legal basis for
this Court to grant relief from garnishments issued from the State Court.
6 See Amended Order Implementing Electronic-Filing for Civil Cases, Admin. Order 2015-EX01168, Fulton County Superior Court (September 16,2015) (the "E-File Order").
4

5

Equitrade International, Inc. and James Allen West v. Bus-man,et al.; CAFN 20 13CV233445; Order

"[U]pon a finding that notice was not provided as required by Code Atm. § 24-2620 [now
O.C.G.A.

§ 15-6-21], the motion to set aside may be granted, the judgment re-entered, and the

thirty-day period within which the losing party must appeal will begin to run from the date of the
re-entry." Miranda v. Stewart, 312 Ga. App. 290,292 (2011) (quoting Cambron v Canal Ins.

Co., 246 Ga. 147 (1980)).

"The holding in Cambron serves to correct the prejudice caused by a

trial court's error in failing to notify the losing party of the judgment."
236 Ga. App. 361,362

Vangoosen v. Bohannon,

(1999) (citations omitted). "Nothing in Cambron allows the court to set

aside the judgment and then proceed as if no judgment had ever been entered." Id. "Rather,

Cambron requires that the trial cOUli re-enter the judgment at issue." Id. Thus, the Court will
re-enter the Consent Judgment in order to cure any prejudice to West and Equitrade pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(g) and the cases cited herein. Before re-entering the Consent Judgment,
however, the Court will consider Plaintiffs' arguments raised in their out-of-time brief and these
Motions that the Consent Judgment should be set aside as it was entered "without legal basis."

3. Was Entry of the Consent Judgment Proper?
Plaintiffs argue the filing of the Consent Judgment was without legal basis. Instead,
Plaintiffs argue they complied with the spirit of the Settlement Agreement, the IRS Notice of
Levy, and 26 US.C. § 6332. Under US. Code, "any person in possession of (or obligated with
respect to) property or rights to property subject to levy upon which a levy has been made shall,
upon demand of the Secretary, surrender such property or rights (or discharge such obligation) to
the Secretary, except such part of the property or rights as is, at the time of such demand, subject
to an attachment or execution under any judicial process."

26 US.C. § 6332(a). This section

6
EquitradeInternational, Inc. and James Allen West v. Busman, et al.; CAFN 20 13CV233445; Order

discharges any obligation or liability to the delinquent taxpayer with respect to payments
surrendered to the IRS pursuant to a tax levy. 26 U.S.C. § 6332(e).

However, the briefs filed by

Plaintiffs reference exhibits, including the Notice of Levy, that were never placed before the
Court. Further, the Settlement Agreement makes clear that West and Equitrade are required to
pay the money to Hearn individually and satisfy Barter's Trust Fund tax debt on behalf of both

Hearn and Barter. By submitting the payments due to Hearn to the IRS in satisfaction of the tax
debt, Plaintiffs are not satisfying the letter or the spirit of the Settlement Agreement. Instead
they are using money owed to Hearn to satisfy the IRS debt that they also agreed to pay. West
and Equitrade cannot avoid their obligation to pay past due taxes on the Trust Fund Debt by
redirecting the $72,000 owed individually to Hearn to the IRS.
Plaintiffs have not met the requirements to set aside a judgment under O.C.G.A. § 9-1160(d). Plaintiffs have not shown this Court lacked jurisdiction to enter the Consent Judgment.
As noted above, the case was administratively closed but the Court retained jurisdiction over the
case to ensure the terms of the Settlement Agreement were satisfied and to enter the Consent
Judgment if they were not satisfied.

Likewise, Plaintiffs have not shown that fraud, accident, or

mistake or the acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the movant
caused the Consent Judgment to be filed. At most, Plaintiffs argue Hearn was aware of the IRS
Notice of Levy sent to Plaintiffs and they believed this was a proper basis to redirect payments to
the IRS instead of to Hearn. However, Plaintiffs did not timely respond to the Motion to raise
this argument and have not placed sufficient evidence on the record of the IRS Levy. Finally,
there is no allegation by Plaintiff of a nonamendable defect on the face of the record or
7
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pleadings.

Finding no basis under O.C.O.A. § 9-11-60(d) to set aside the Consent Judgment, the

COUli DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Consent Judgment and DENIES Plaintiffs'
Motion for Emergency Hearing and to Cancel All Levies on Plaintiff and to Set Aside Consent
Judgment. The Consent Judgment will be refiled herewith to cure any possible prejudice to
Plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED this

-f-!l!- day of October, 2016.
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SERVED VIA EFileGA on All Registered Users associated with the case.

Plaintiffs

Attorneys for Defendants

.;

Attorneys for Lee Ann Busman [HearnJand
the individual corporations

Pro Se Plaintiff:

J ames Alan West
3731 Northcrest Road, Suite 31
Atlanta, GA 30340

Kevin T. Moore
6111 Peachtree Dunwoody Road
Building C, Suite 201
Atlanta, GA 30328
ktm@ktmtriallaw.com

Attorney for Equitrade International, Inc.
Shannan Collier
3330 Cumberland Blvd., Suite 400
Atlanta, GA 30339
404-419- 7113
Shannan@sscollier.com
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